
Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
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Product Information
| ISBN | 9783642358210 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Demet Cetiner |
| Publisher | Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG |
| Format | Paperback |
| Number of pages | 168 |
| Publishing Date | 13/04/2013 |
| Price (excl. tax) | €56.51 |
| Tax | €3.39 |
| Price (incl. tax) | €59.90 |
| Availability | 1 unit in external warehouse |
Product Description
?A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.