Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

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Product Information

ISBN9783642358210
AuthorsDemet Cetiner
PublisherSpringer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
FormatPaperback
Number of pages168
Publishing Date13/04/2013
Price (excl. tax)€56.51
Tax€3.39
Price (incl. tax)€59.90
Availability1 unit in external warehouse

Product Description

?A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.